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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4380
This paper focuses on an evaluation and benchmarking 
of the governance of regulatory agencies in the electricity 
sector in Latin American Countries (LAC). Using 
a unique database, the authors develop an index of 
regulatory governance and rank all the agencies in the 
LAC countries. The index is an aggregate number of 
the evaluation of four key governance characteristics: 
autonomy, transparency, accountability, and regulatory 
tools, including not only formal aspects of regulation 
but also indicators related to actual implementation. 
Based on 18 different indexes, the authors analyze the 
positions of agencies with regard to different aspects 
of their regulatory governance, considering not only 
performance in each variable but also scores in the 
different components of each category. This evaluation 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Development Department in the Latin America and the Caribbean Region—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to understand the determinants for performance in the infrastructure sectors. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted 
at landres@worldbank.org, jguasch@worldbank.org, mdiop2@worldbank.org, and slopezazumendi@worldbank.org.
allows for the identification of particular country 
shortcomings regarding governance, and indicates needed 
improvements. Although the region shows an overall 
good governance design of their regulatory agencies, the 
implementation of the independent regulator model 
still faces several challenges. This is particularly evident 
in political autonomy and in the informal aspects of 
governance, where the region shows the largest number 
of countries with the lowest scores. Trinidad and Tobago 
and Brazil show the best results and Ecuador, Honduras, 
and Chile the poorest performances. The rest of the 
countries vary according to the different indexes. The 
authors give each governance variable equal weights 
and positively test the robustness of our approach using 
Principal Component Analysis. 
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According to an increasing body of empirical evidence, institutions matter for growth and 
development (Aron, 2000; Rodrik, 2004). The infrastructure sector generally, and the electricity 
sector in particular, are not an exception to this finding. Several research projects on the subject 
have associated better sector performance, represented by higher levels of electricity generation per 




Although there have been different institutional arrangements established to implement regulatory 
policies, a separate agency from the government with reasonable levels of autonomy and technical 
expertise has emerged as the paradigm of a regulatory institution. In fact, this has been the case in 
the Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) region. Beginning with Chile’s National Energy 
Commission in 1978 and ending in 2001 with Barbados’ Fair Trading Commission, today 70 
percent of countries in the region have a separate entity—with varying degrees of independence—to 
regulate electricity markets (LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 
2007) 
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Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, 2007. The World Bank. 2007   
Even though it has been more than 10 years since the majority of LAC countries established 
independent agencies, the study of their governance has been limited and poorly focused. With 
some exceptions (Correa et al, 2006; Brown et al, 2007; Guasch and Spiller, 1999), the research on 
the subject has limited the assessment of regulatory agencies to a few governance indicators, 
specifically focusing on their independence from political authorities. This is particularly the case of 
the electricity sector of the LAC region where, beyond specific agency-based studies, regional 
analyses that assess institutional design and governance behavior do not exist. 
 
In this paper we attempt to fill that gap by focusing on the regulatory governance of independent 
agencies in the electricity sector of LAC. We define regulatory governance as the agency’s 
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 There is no one single factor that is unidirectional in its link to the performance of the electricity sector. Service 
quality, the final goal of electric infrastructure, is the result of the interaction of several factors such as the management 
of utilities (both private and public), the quality of regulation, the formulation of the energy policies by the government, 
the country’s institutional endowments, and macroeconomic determinants. In this context, we are currently in the 
process of assessing the weight and influence of these factors in the quality of electricity services. This paper will be the 
basis for assessing the role of regulatory governance on sector performance (through the combination of our database 
with info collected at the company level). institutional design and structure that allows it to carry its functions as an independent regulator. 
Based on selected literature on the subject, we define and assess electricity’s agencies governance 
through four main characteristics: 1) autonomy from political authorities and of their management 
and regulatory competencies; 2) transparency before institutional and non-institutional stakeholders; 
3) accountability to the three branches of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary); and 4) 
tools and capacities for the conduct of the regulatory policy and the improvement of its institutional 
development. 
 
Our assessment of the governance of regulatory agencies is based on the regulatory and institutional 
inputs agencies need to implement their procedures and tools and does not consider the outputs or 
outcomes of agencies’ regulation.
2 In other words, our measurement of agencies’ governance is not 
an indicator of the effectiveness of the use of their regulatory instruments (such as the methodology 
to calculate tariff readjustment) or the quality of stakeholders’ involvement in public consultations. 
It is aimed at capturing the institutional conditions necessary to achieve good regulation regardless 
of their scope and impact on the sector’s performance (Correa et al, 2006). Although we consider 
some practices (informal regulation) of agencies’ governance, these indicators are referred to the 
operationalization of particular aspects of agencies’ governance but do not reflect their full 
effectiveness. For instance, although we asked agencies whether they met their obligation in 
preparing an annual report of their activities (formal regulation) and their actual publication and 
means of publicizing it (informal regulation), this indicator does not imply that the report is well 
written and comprehensive. Similarly, although we use the number of Board directors that have left 
their positions due to resignation or dismissal as a proxy for agency’s independence from political 
authorities, this is not a judgment on the full independence of the agency from the Executive. 
Moreover, the undue influence of political authorities may be exerted by no visible (and most 
importantly not subject to be reflected in a survey) de facto mechanisms. 
 
The final goal is to benchmark the electricity regulatory agencies of the region based on the quality 
of their regulatory governance, which is given by the presence of selected procedures and tools. The 
benchmark model through which regulatory agencies are assessed is an “independent regulatory 
agency” with political and technical autonomy from government authorities and adequate 
mechanisms for achieving a transparent resource management and accountability. Our 
benchmarking tools are 18 indexes that measure different aspects of agencies’ governance. 
 
Data was collected through a survey submitted by nineteen electricity regulators of the region 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Uruguay) composed of 97 questions related to the characteristics of the country’s electricity 
markets and the agency’s governance design (See Appendix 2). 
 
A potential criticism of this research is that the data has been self-reported by the agencies. 
Although this might affect the impartiality and veracity of some responses, several factors allow us 
to still consider this approach sufficiently robust. First, the majority of the questions are related to 
legal provisions or factual circumstances with little space for subjective interpretations. Second, in 
the few cases of questions that are subject to agencies’ interpretations, biased answers should not 
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 This has been the overwhelming mechanism used by the literature on the subject to assess the independence and other 
attributes of regulatory agencies. Although, ideally, we would like to include the effectiveness of the different 
institutional arrangements on sector performance and on institutional quality outcomes, the cross-regional nature of our 
research and the limited resources to undertake this task convinced us of this approach as the most convenient. affect the overall ranking as the degree of subjectivity is the same for all respondents. Third, the 
majority, if not all, of the research on the subject has also used self-reporting to address regulatory 
design in independent agencies, as it’s the most cost-effective method (particularly in the case of 
regional studies like ours). Finally, we have included a considerable number of indicators that 
minimize the impact of particular wrong or biased answers. 
 
The paper is divided in four main sections. Next section is a review of the literature on institutional 
design of independent agencies. It presents the main research on the subject and identifies its 
strengths and weaknesses. Section 3 presents the methodology of this paper, describing the 
benchmark model, theoretical framework, levels of analysis, and indexes used to measure agencies’ 
governance. Section 4 assesses the regulatory governance of LAC electricity regulatory agencies. 
The assessment is done through the characterization of agencies’ governance at the regional, 
country, and variable levels. Section 5 includes a robustness analysis in which we explore two 
alternative approaches and show the consistency with the main findings. Section 5, and the final 





























•  Address the governance design and practices of regulatory agencies in terms of their autonomy, 
transparency, accountability, and tools 
•  Assess how far/close are LAC countries from the independent regulator model in the electricity 
sector 
•  Fill an existing gap in the literature of the governance of regulatory agencies in the Latin 




•  Relate agencies’ governance to sector performance (service quality, labor productivity, etc). 
Although, after collecting data on the performance of private and public companies in the 
electricity distribution sector, we are currently assessing this relationship 
•  Establish a relationship between an agency’s institutional design and its governance 
effectiveness. Although we have several indicators of regulatory practices (related to the 
implementation of the agencies’ procedures and tools) they were included to reflect the 
operationalization of agencies’ governance variables and not to be used to make a judgment of 










  - 4 -2.   LITERATURE REVIEW: 
 
The different studies that have assessed regulatory agencies in the infrastructure sector have 
considered the United States (US) model of the independent commission as their benchmark of 
comparison and analysis. An institutional design model that emphasizes agencies that make 
decisions independently from the Executive branch, are subject to the accountability of the 
Parliament, and have budgeting autonomy that has emerged as the paradigm of an infrastructure 
regulator. 
 
The first attempts to evaluate infrastructure regulatory agencies made use of frameworks to assess 
the independence of Central Banks (Stern and Cubbin, 2005; Oliverira, Machado, Novaes, and 
Ferreira, 2005). This explains the original emphasis on agencies’ independence and the reduced 
significance given to other aspects of their functioning such as accountability and transparency. The 
evolution of the subject and the initial stages of agencies’ functioning changed the original approach 
and introduced more comprehensive strategies to assessment.  
 
The literature has dealt in both ways with the design of regulatory agencies: by focusing only on 
independence and by considering other variables of agencies’ functioning, namely accountability 
and transparency. A third approach (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD], 1997) involves the consideration of mechanisms to achieve high quality regulation (for 
instance, the use of Regulatory Impact Analysis) regardless of the sector and the agency’s design. 
The following paragraphs summarize the different methodologies that have been used to assess the 
governance of independent regulatory agencies. 
 
Johannsen (2003) measures the formal independence of energy regulators in eight European 
countries (Austria, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Northern Ireland, and Spain). Using 
information collected through surveys, she assesses the independence of energy regulatory agencies 
through four main variables: a) independence from government, b) independence from stakeholders, 
c) independence in the decision-making process, and d) organizational autonomy. The survey’s 
questions reflect formal regulation with no consideration for the practices of regulatory agencies. 
The energy regulator in Italy proves to be the organization with the largest degree of independence, 
followed by Ireland and Northern Ireland, respectively. Spain and Luxembourg are the countries 
with the lowest scores. The paper concludes by highlighting the differences between the theoretical 
concepts of regulatory independence and the actual design of independent regulators. According to 
Johannsen, the regulatory power of independent authorities can be very weak, reflecting the fact 
that the main emphasis has been on creating independent bodies rather than independent regulation. 
Furthermore, she suggests the need to refocus the discussion of independent regulators, 
emphasizing their actual activities rather than theoretical design. 
 
Gilardi (2002) develops an independence index, covering regulators from five sectors in seven 
European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom). The author attempts to prove that governments delegate their regulatory powers and 
competences to independent regulatory agencies to enhance the credibility of their policies. The 
independence index focuses on formal independence and is divided into five components: a) the 
status of the head of the agency; b) the management board members’ status; c) the general nature of 
the relationships with the government and the parliament; d) the degree of financial and 
organizational autonomy; and e) the extent of delegated regulatory competencies. The paper 
concludes by confirming the “credibility theory” and stressing the positive impact of the economic 
nature of regulation (as opposed to social regulation) and of low veto players on delegation. In other 
  - 5 -words, in sectors subject to economic regulation (such as utilities) and where veto players are few, 
there is more delegation to regulatory authorities. 
 
In another article (Gilardi, 2005), the same author proposes three ways of evaluating independent 
regulators. Considering our interest in the governance of regulatory agencies, we focus on two of 
the three mechanisms suggested by Gilardi to evaluate regulators: the impact of an agency’s 
independence on regulatory quality and an agency’s respect for accountability standards. The third 
approach, the impact of agency’s independence on the performance of the market it regulates, is not 
considered in this literature review.  
 
Gilardi (2005) correlates independence to regulatory quality through econometric analysis, where 
the dependent variable is a measure of regulatory quality and the main independent variable is a 
measure of the relevant characteristic of the regulator, namely independence. The concept of 
regulatory quality was developed by the OECD and refers to procedural requirements aimed at 
improving the quality of regulations. These requirements are built around 10 elements: the 
definition of the problem, the assessment of the justification for government action, its form and 
level, the legal basis for regulation, a cost-benefit analysis of issuing new procedures, the 
transparency of distributive effects, the clarity and accessibility of regulation, the openness of the 
decision-making process, and compliance mechanisms. Gilardi also uses a second method of 
evaluating independent regulators: an “accountability assessment” that helps to determine whether 
transparency standards are met. Based on the literature on Central Banks’ independence and 
transparency, the paper selects five main dimensions of transparency: a) political transparency 
(openness of policy objectives); b) economic transparency (economic information used for policy 
such as data, models, etc); c) procedural transparency (how policy decisions are made); d) policy 
transparency (announcements and explanations of policy decisions); and e) operational transparency 
(implementation of policy decisions). 
 
Gutierrez (2003) develops a Regulatory Framework Index (RFI) to asses the evolution of regulatory 
governance in the telecommunications sector during the period 1980–2001 in 25 LAC countries. 
The index is composed of three main aspects: a) the scope of the legal mandate that creates the 
institution (whether it is a law, decree, or other inferior law); b) the separation of regulatory 
activities between the regulators and the service provider; and c) characteristics of the regulatory 
institution: autonomy (financial and budgetary independence and no free removal of 
commissioners); accountability (right to appeal the agency’s decisions and the power of the agency 
to resolve disputes between authorities and operators); clarity of roles (measured by the regulatory 
body’s ability to impose fines and set tariffs); and transparency (measured by the existence of 
hearings for the setting of tariffs and other issues). According to Gutierrez, the RFI shows that most 
countries embraced strong regulatory reforms along the lines recommended by experts and 
practitioners. 
 
Stern and Holder (1999) develop a framework to assess the governance of economic regulators in 
several sectors (electricity, natural gas, telecom, transport, and water) in six developing Asian 
economies (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines). Their appraisal 
scheme is composed of two variables related to the formal (institutional design) and informal 
(regulatory processes and practices) aspects of regulation. The first variable contains the following 
components: clarity of roles and objectives, autonomy, and accountability. The second variable 
includes participation, transparency, and predictability. Results indicate middle-low levels of 
regulatory governance for all the sectors and countries included in the research. Moreover, results 
are relatively uniform by country across the industries, with the exception of India. 
 
  - 6 -In addition to Stern and Holder’s attempt to measure informal regulation, Magetti develops a 
framework to assess the real independence of regulatory agencies. His framework is composed of 
two main features: 1) the degree of self-determination of agencies’ preferences and 2) the degree to 
which those preferences are translated into regulatory acts. The first feature is assessed through the 
measurement of the agency’s independence from both government authorities and the utilities it 
regulates. Indicators used to measure the agency’s independence from government authorities are: 
a) autonomy of low-level employees (need for collaboration with experts from the public 
administration); b) autonomy of resources; c) autonomy of board members (influence of partisan 
membership on nominations); and d) the vulnerability of the board (measured by how the 
substitution rate and political changes correlate with the frequency of early departures of board 
members). Indicators that measure the independence of the agency from those it regulates are 
composed of a) and b) above, as well as a third indicator related to conflict of interest (e.g., business 
connections, family ties). The second feature is measured through the degree of influence of 
relevant actors on legislative processes that define or redefine the competencies of the agencies. Its 
main purpose is to determine how much new laws integrate the agency’s point of view. He applies 
his approach to the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC), finding that the SFBC has higher 
levels of informal independence from political authorities than from the regulatees. With regards to 
the degree of influence of relevant actors on the legislative process, Magetti finds the informal 
independence of the SFBC to be quite low, particularly vis-à-vis political decision makers. 
 
Two comprehensive approaches to assessing the governance of regulatory agencies have been those 
developed by Correa et al. (2006) and Brown et al. (2006). Correa et al. provide a detailed analysis 
of Brazilian regulatory agencies. The authors select four aspects of agencies’ governance and, based 
on information collected through surveys, construct three indexes. Selected governance variables 
are a) autonomy (political and financial autonomy and the degree of delegation); b) decision-
making (degree to which administrative procedures are adopted and reflect respect for due process, 
rule of law, transparency, and stakeholder participation); c) decision tools (legal means to collect 
information, appropriate budget to manage and process this information, qualified personnel and 
regulatory tools); and d) accountability (appeals mechanisms, role of oversight institutions, and 
transparency of regulations and procedures). Agencies’ governance is measured through three 
indexes. The first index, the Regulatory Governance Index, is the base-line indicator and represents 
the most comprehensive dataset of all the indexes. The second index, the Parsimonious Index, 
captures those variables of the survey that are less subjective. The third index, the Facto Index, is 
related to actual practices of regulatory agencies. The report finds that independence and 
accountability are more developed than regulatory means and instruments (particularly qualified 
personnel and regulatory tools) and decision-making procedures (particularly with respect to those 
mechanisms that can guarantee consistency of decisions and reduce arbitrariness). It also finds that 
there is a clear difference between federal and state regulatory agencies, with the former achieving 
higher results in the autonomy, decision-making, and decision tools components of the Regulatory 
Governance Index. 
 
Brown et al. (2006) develop a framework to assess the effectiveness of a regulatory system. They 
aim to provide the policy-maker with different types of evaluations (quick, mid-level, and in-depth) 
to carry out these assessments. The authors include aspects related not only to the governance of the 
regulatory system (independence, transparency, and accountability of the regulator) but also to the 
substance or content of the regulation (decisions about tariff levels and structures, network access 
conditions for new and existing customers). Using the independent regulator model as the 
benchmark of analysis, they select 10 principles that should be followed in order to create an 
independent regulatory agency. The principles are: independence (freedom to make decisions 
within their scope of authority without having to obtain prior approval from other officials or 
  - 7 -agencies of the government); accountability (appeals, reporting obligations, oversight of 
performance, ethical procedures); transparency and public participation (requirements for 
regulations and rule-making procedures to be transparent and open to the public); predictability 
(processes for the implementation of agencies’ regulations and decisions); clarity of roles (within 
the agency, between the agency and other agencies, and between the agency and the government); 
proportionality (relationship between the objective of regulations and the mechanisms/means for 
their implementation); requisite powers agencies should posses to perform their mission (e.g. tariff 
setting, regulation of service quality); appropriate institutional characteristics (e.g.  collective 
decision-making, training for employees, budgetary independence and adequacy); and integrity 
(ethics provisions). The principles are accompanied by standards that establish the details for their 
implementation. 
 
The literature on the governance of independent 
regulatory agencies has focused on three main 
aspects of their design: a) their independence from 
political authorities and the autonomy of their 
management; b) mechanisms to make them 
accountable (both to other branches of 
government and to the public); and c) the 
transparency of both their rule and decision-
making procedures. Within these categories, 
indicators range from simple measures to 
determine, for instance, independence (such as the 
legal instruments that created the agency) to more 
sophisticated mechanisms aimed, for example, at 
improving the quality of regulation (such as 
Regulatory Impact Analysis). 






TRANSPARENCY  ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
Research on the regulatory governance of independent agencies has evolved and changed. Despite 
the original focus on independence (influenced by the literature on Central Banks’ independence), a 
growing body of literature has been using more comprehensive approaches to address institutional 
design. Good examples of this trend are the works of Correa et al. (2006) and Brown et al. (2006), 
which approach the assessment of independent regulatory agencies through the classic lens of 
autonomy, transparency, and accountability, but include a wide array of indicators within these 
variables as well as innovative tools to understand and assess their functioning. Furthermore, this 
literature focuses not only on the formal aspects of regulation (provisions existing in agencies’ 
statues and laws) but also on informal regulation (aspects related to the implementation of the 
provisions’ components). 
 
This approach is useful as it recognizes the broad nature of the role of regulatory agencies: they are 
institutions responsible for driving investment in infrastructure, but also are decentralized 
administrative bodies in charge as such of delivering public services to citizens. 
 
In this paper, we propose a framework identified with more comprehensive approaches to assess the 
governance of electricity independent agencies. The next sections of the paper present the 
methodology, assessment, and conclusions of our study. 
 
3.   METHODOLOGY: 
 
  - 8 -This paper assesses the regulatory governance of electricity independent agencies in LAC region. In 
order to do that, we selected a theoretical framework of analysis and designed a survey that was 
completed by nineteen countries of the region (Trinidad and Tobago, Peru, Mexico, El Salvador, 
Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, Ecuador, the Dominican 
Republic, Argentina, Jamaica, Honduras, Chile, and Uruguay). The evaluation of agencies’ 
governance was done through several indexes that reflect different dimensions of agencies’ 
organization and functioning.  
 
Following Correa et al. (2006) and the majority of the research on the subject, we measure only 
electricity agencies’ governance structure and the implementation of some components and do not 
assess the impact of agencies’ decisions on regulatory outcomes, despite the consideration of 
agencies’ practices in our Electricity Regulatory Governance Index. In other words, we do not 
measure the impact of agencies’ governance on the performance of the sector or the quality of their 
regulations.  
 
3.1 The benchmark model of analysis: 
 








We assess electricity regulatory agencies using the 
independent regulator model as our benchmark of 
analysis. This decision was based on two main 
factors. The first factor is related to the use of 
independent regulatory agencies as the model for 
electricity regulation in the majority of the region. 
According to our database,
3 almost 70 percent of 
the countries in the region have adopted a separate 
regulator from the line ministry as the preferred 
institutional arrangement for electricity regulation. 
The second factor is related to empirical evidence 
that considers the independent regulator model as 
the most effective approach in the regulation of 
privatized infrastructure industries (Brown et al., 
2006).  
Figure 3: Countries with separate electricity 





3.2 Theoretical framework: 
 
We conceive regulatory agencies as both public bodies that are part of the public administration—
and as such in charge of the delivery of public services—and as instruments to implement 
regulatory policies. This approach to assessing electricity agencies’ governance led us to consider 
not only existing research on infrastructure agencies’ designs (documented in the literature review), 
but also notions and tools of public sector governance applied to decentralized structures of 
government. 
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 Based on the information collected through the surveys submitted by countries, we designed a database composed of 
46 electricity regulators (including both federal and national regulators). This paper analyzes the governance of national 
electricity regulatory agencies and does not include agencies at the state level.  
Figure 4 represents the selected framework to assess the governance of independent regulatory 
agencies in the electricity sector of LAC. The regulatory governance of independent agencies is 
defined and assessed according to four variables of their design and functioning: autonomy, 
transparency, accountability, and tools. Each of the variables, with the exception of accountability, 
is composed of several elements, reflecting different aspects of autonomy, transparency, and tools. 
We consider only an institutional perspective of accountability as defined by the relationships of the 
agency with the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches of government. Autonomy is 
divided into political, managerial, and regulatory autonomy; transparency, into social and 
institutional transparency; and tools are divided into regulatory and institutional tools. 
Figure 4
   
 represents the selected framework to assess the governance of independent regulatory 
agencies in the electricity sector of LAC. The regulatory governance of independent agencies is 
defined and assessed according to four variables of their design and functioning: autonomy, 
transparency, accountability, and tools. Each of the variables, with the exception of accountability, 
is composed of several elements, reflecting different aspects of autonomy, transparency, and tools. 
We consider only an institutional perspective of accountability as defined by the relationships of the 
agency with the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches of government. Autonomy is 
divided into political, managerial, and regulatory autonomy; transparency, into social and 
institutional transparency; and tools are divided into regulatory and institutional tools. 
   
Figure 4: The Assessment Framework 






















Variables for agencies’ governance reflect not only formal aspects (procedures and tools established 
in the agency’s statute or laws) but also the practices that derive from their implementation 
(informal regulation). Indicators for the informal elements of autonomy, accountability, and 
transparency represent the operationalization of some aspects of these variables. The variable 
“tools” is excluded from this analysis as the mere existence of these instruments implies their actual 
implementation. 
 
The first variable of agencies’ regulatory governance is autonomy. We define autonomy as the 
procedures, mechanisms, and instruments aimed at guaranteeing the independence of the agency 
from political authorities (political autonomy), the autonomous management of its resources 
(managerial autonomy), and the regulation of the sector (regulatory autonomy). Political autonomy 
represents the level of independence of the agency from government authorities and is measured by 
indicators that reflect the autonomy of the agency’s decision-making. Managerial autonomy 
involves the freedom of the agency to determine the administration of its resources and is measured 
by indicators that reflect the powers of the agency to determine its organizational structure and the 
No distinction is made 
Formal/informal 
ACCOUNTABILITY 











SELECTED VARIABLES AND 







  - 10 -use of its budget. Regulatory autonomy is defined by the extension of the agency’s regulatory 
powers in the electricity sector and is represented by indicators that capture agencies’ 
responsibilities in electricity regulation. 
 
The second aspect of agency’s governance is accountability, which we define as the procedures, 
mechanisms, and instruments aimed at guaranteeing an adequate level of control of the agency’s 
budget and performance by political authorities, namely the Parliament. Despite the successful use 
of mechanisms to assess the performance of agencies by governments, we prioritize the 
accountability of the agency before the Parliament. We based this decision on two main reasons: 
First, the fact that the institutional design model we follow is that of a US independent commission, 
where agencies are subject to parliamentary oversight. Second, the history of political interference 
of LAC line ministries in utilities underscores the importance of including other political 
stakeholders, such as the Parliament, in the regulatory process. We consider an institutional 
perspective of accountability only as defined by the relationships of the agency with the three 
branches of government (Executive, Legislative and the Judiciary) and do not further dissect the 
variable.  
 
The third variable is transparency. We define transparency as the procedures, mechanisms, and 
instruments aimed at guaranteeing the disclosure and publication of relevant regulatory and 
institutional information, the participation of stakeholders in the agency’s regulatory decisions and 
decision-making, and the application of rules aimed at governing the integrity and behavior of 
agency officials. We cover two dimensions of transparency: social transparency and institutional 
transparency. Social transparency is composed of indicators related to the involvement of non-
institutional actors in the agency’s policy-making, including their access to the agency’s 
information.  Institutional transparency is composed of indicators related to the transparent 
management of the agency that are not directly linked to stakeholder involvement, and includes 
issues such as the publication of the agency’s annual report, the use of norms of ethics, and the 
existence of public exams for hiring employees. 
 
The fourth variable is tools, which we define as the instruments and mechanisms that contribute to 
the strengthening of different aspects of an agency’s functioning and the quality of its regulations. 
We include not only regulatory tools ( e.g.  mechanisms for tariff revision, regulatory 
accountability, instruments for monitoring technical standards), but also those instruments aimed at 
improving the institutional quality of the agency, or institutional tools (e.g. audits of agencies’ 
accounts, electronic files for consumer complaints, performance-based payments for employees, 
regulatory quality standards). This is the only variable whose analysis does not consider its formal 
and informal aspects; the sole existence of agencies’ tools implies their actual implementation. 
 
3.3 The survey: 
 
In order to assess the governance of electricity regulators in LAC, we designed a survey that was 
distributed to all electricity regulatory agencies in the region, including not only national but also 
provincial or state regulators (particularly in the cases of Argentina and Brazil). All LAC countries 
that are members of the World Bank Group and have an electricity regulatory agency were 
included.  
 
We received responses from 43 electricity regulatory agencies, whose coverage in terms of 
electricity consumers exceeds 90 percent of the region. Despite the high number of responses, due 
to time and methodological constraints we limited our research to national electricity regulatory 
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agency, with the exception of Colombia and Chile, for which we assigned unique values since they 
each have two different agencies with regulatory functions. 
 
In both Colombia and Chile, regulatory responsibilities are shared between a National Energy 
Commission in charge of the main regulatory aspects (tariffs, approval of contracts) and an 
Oversight Electricity Agency (in the case of Chile, the Superintendencia de Electricidad y 
Combustibles and in the case of Colombia, the Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos) in charge of 
the sector’s oversight (service quality, sanctions’ enforcing, consumer complaints). Considering that 
both agencies perform different tasks that in other countries are undertaken by only one regulator, 
we “merged” both administrative bodies and assigned a unique value for the country. For those 
institutional aspects that should be reflected in both agencies, such as the independence of their 
decision-making (e.g.. the appointment of directors) or the transparency of their management (e.g. 
account audits), we assigned the country an average score calculated from both agencies’ scores on 
the same question. For instance, if the Comisión Nacional de Energía of Chile was assigned 0 for 
not auditing its accounts and the Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles was assigned 1 
for auditing its accounts, then Chile would obtain 0.5 for that question. In those aspects where the 
agencies had separate responsibilities (e.g. the regulation of tariffs by the Comisión Reguladora de 
la Energía of Colombia and the reception of consumers’ claims by the Superintendencia de 
Servicios Públicos), we assigned the country the score achieved by the agency with responsibility in 
that issue, regardless of the score obtained by the other agency for the same issue. 
 
The questionnaire is composed of 97 questions (for the full version of the survey, see Appendix 2) 
reflecting the 4 variables of agencies’ governance and both formal and informal aspects of their 
functioning. We also included a general section aimed at capturing characteristics of electricity 
markets such as the methodology for tariff calculation, the degree of market liberalization, and 
social tariffs.  
 
In the design and selection of the survey’s main variables and their components, we complemented 
our own approach with the literature review in the previous section. 
 
3.4 The levels of analysis: 
 
We assess the regulatory governance of electricity regulatory agencies in the LAC region through 
three levels of analysis. The first level of analysis considers the overall performance of electricity 
regulatory agencies’ governance and their standing in each of the variables (autonomy, 
transparency, accountability, and tools). The second level of analysis focuses on the formal and 
informal aspects of regulatory agencies in terms of autonomy, transparency, and accountability. 
Finally, the third level of analysis considers the standing of regulatory agencies in each of the 
variables and their scores in the different elements that compose those categories. 
 
The first level of analysis is represented by the Electricity Regulatory Governance Index (ERGI) 
and four indexes related to each of the governance variables (Autonomy Index, Accountability 
Index, Transparency Index, Tools Index). The ERGI is the main index and is composed of 74 
questions related to agencies’ four aspects of governance: autonomy, transparency, accountability, 
and tools. Questions reflect both formal and informal dimensions of agencies’ functioning, with the 
exception of tools. The ERGI provides us with a ranking of LAC agencies in terms of the overall 
quality of their regulatory governance. The Autonomy, Accountability, Transparency, and Tools 
Indexes reflect agencies’ positions in each of these categories. 
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The rest of the indexes reflect the second and third levels of analysis and their indicators derive 
from the ERGI. The Formal/Informal Autonomy Indexes, Formal/Informal Transparency Indexes, 
and Formal/Informal Accountability Indexes are aimed at identifying relationships between 
agencies’ formal and informal regulations.
4 The different aspects of agencies’ autonomy (political, 
managerial, and regulatory), transparency (social and institutional), and tools (regulatory and 
institutional) are reflected in seven indexes composed of indicators related to each of these aspects: 
Political Autonomy Index, Managerial Autonomy Index, and Regulatory Autonomy Index; Social 
Transparency Index and Institutional Transparency Index; Regulatory and Institutional Tools 
Indexes. They were developed to better assess the performance of an agency’s governance in each 
of the variables. In addition, they constitute a useful tool to compare the scores of regulatory 
agencies in each variable and its components. 
 
All the indexes measure their indicators with a value range between 0 (lowest) and 1 (highest), 
giving all variables the same weight. Although the majority of the agencies responded to the 97 
questions that were part of the survey, in some cases questions were not answered. This occurred 
because either the agency simply did not answer or the question was not applicable. For example, 
an agency answered negatively to the question regarding the existence of mechanisms to involve 
stakeholders in the rule-making process, and thus did not answer the question related to the actual 
involvement of stakeholders in the same process, as it was not applicable.  
 
Questions that were not answered because the agency omitted the response were not counted in the 
agency’s score. In the cases of those questions that were not answered because they were not 
applicable to the agency, we filled that gap by considering the purpose of the index. In the ERGI 
and in those indexes related to agencies’ formal and informal regulation (e.g. Formal/Informal 
Autonomy Index), we did not count questions that were not applicable. The rationale behind this 
decision is the fact that in those indexes the formal and informal aspects of agencies’ governance 
are considered separately; hence classifying the lack of response to the informal questions as 
negative would unfairly affect an agency’s score. In those indexes that resulted from 
disaggregations of the ERGI (e.g. Political, Managerial, and Regulatory Autonomy Indexes), we 
merged questions related to the formal and informal aspects of the same subject and considered one 
response. Using the example again of the question related to stakeholders’ participation, if an 
agency said it did not have mechanisms to involve stakeholders in its rule-making process and then 
said the question related to their actual involvement was not applicable, then a negative value (0) 
would be assigned. If the agency’s law did establish the participation of stakeholders in its rule-
making process, but they did not actually get involved, then we also considered both questions as 
one and also assigned a negative (0) value.  
 
Table 1: Levels of Analysis and Corresponding Indexes 
LEVEL OF ANALYSIS  DESCRIPTION  INDEX  OUTCOME 
 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF 
AGENCIES’ GOVERNANCE 
 
Analysis of agencies’ 
autonomy, transparency, 
accountability and tools.  
  Ranking of LAC 
agencies in terms of the 
quality of their 
regulatory governance. 
Electricity Regulatory 
Governance Index (ERGI) 
 
Autonomy Index   
  Ranking of LAC 
agencies in autonomy, 
transparency, 




                                                 
 




FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
DIMENSIONS OF AGENCIES’ 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Analysis of the formal and 
informal aspects of agencies’ 
autonomy, transparency and 
accountability. Tools is 
excluded from this approach 
as we only consider the use by 
the agency of selected tools 
(informal regulation) 
  Agencies’ performance 
in the formal and 









the formal and informal 










Analysis of each dimension of 
governance variables. 
Questions reflect both formal 
and informal regulation. 
Performance of 
electricity regulatory 
agencies in each of the 




Political Autonomy Index, 
Regulatory Autonomy Index, 
Managerial Autonomy Index 
 





agencies’ positions in the 
Autonomy, 
Transparency, 
Accountability and Tools 
Indexes and their scores 
in each of the variables’ 
components 
 
Regulatory Tools Index, 





  4.    THE ASSESSMENT OF LAC ELECTRICITY AGENCIES’ REGULATORY 
GOVERNANCE: 
 
This section presents the analysis of regulatory agencies’ governance. Its first part, the Regional 
Analysis, addresses the regional context of regulatory governance in LAC. The Country Analysis 
presents country-level results for the ERGI. The third section, the Variables Analysis, explains each 
of the regulatory governance variables in greater detail. In the fourth section, we test the robustness 
of our approach by giving governance variables different weights. 
 
4.1 Regional analysis: 
 
The LAC region presents a wide spectrum of institutional design in its electricity regulatory 
agencies. Although the majority of countries chose an agency’s design that reflected the governance 
of US independent commissions, others developed their own institutional arrangements for 
electricity regulation. This has been the case of Chile and Colombia, countries that have split 
regulatory responsibilities in two agencies, one in charge of the main regulatory functions (National 
Energy Commission) and one in charge of enforcement of the regulatory framework, particularly in 
terms of the imposition of sanctions and the observance of service quality standards 
(Superintendencia). The rest of the countries, which introduced regulatory agencies during the 
reform of the electricity sector in the 1990s, present a governance design in which the agency has 
both regulatory and oversight responsibilities with different degrees of independence from the 
government. 
 
  - 14 -Our results indicate the prevalence of autonomy over the rest of the variables, with tools as the 
index’s component with the lowest score. With the exception of Chile and Colombia, countries that 
have chosen a particular regulatory design for their electricity agencies, the rest of the countries in 
the region have opted for a model that emphasizes its independence from political authorities over 
other aspects of its functioning. LAC countries have also stressed agencies’ accountability before 
the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary and, to a less extent, the inclusion of mechanisms 
and procedures to guarantee their transparent management (transparency) and the implementation of 
their decisions (tools).  
Figure 5: Ranking of Electricity Regulatory Governance Variables 
 







































The region’s average in the Electricity Regulatory Governance Index (ERGI) is 0.74. Among the 
different variables that compose the ERGI, the region achieves its best performance in autonomy 
(0.79), followed, respectively, by accountability (0.73), transparency (0.72), and tools (0.66). The 
highest score achieved in autonomy and the lower results in other aspects of agencies’ governance 
might reflect the tendency of LAC countries to emphasize regulatory agencies as a means to gain 
credibility before investors (Gilardi, 2002). While there are degrees of variation, the majority of 
independent regulators in the electricity sector have a board of directors appointed by the President 
with the authorization of the Congress, a separate status from the line ministry, and separate 
budgeting (although there are different levels of autonomy in the management of funds). The lowest 
levels of autonomy can be found in agencies in charge of both regulation and sector planning (Chile 
and Colombia), where the government, through the line minister and other ministers, is part of the 
agency’s decision-making process.  
 
Accountability ranks as the second variable after autonomy and indicates the level of oversight of 
the agency by different public bodies (usually the Parliament and the Executive branch). In 
addition, it reflects the existence of mechanisms for internal auditing and the regulatees’ ability to 
appeal agencies’ decisions. The majority of agencies in the electricity sector are subject to the 
oversight of both the Parliament and the Executive, although they have greater accountability 
obligations to the latter. Another factor that contributes to the regional score in accountability is the 
ability to appeal decisions before the judiciary and not exclusively the government. The review of 
agencies’ decisions by the judiciary prevents the government from interfering in the agency’s rule-
making and implementation of those rules.  
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The top ranking of the autonomy variable and the lower scores given to transparency and 
institutional and regulatory tools might be explained by the lack of progress in improving the 
institutional quality of the agencies (represented in the ERGI by several components of the 
transparency and tools variables). With some exceptions, the process that started with the initial 
creation of regulatory agencies in the LAC region has not been furthered and deepened. For 
instance, few agencies publicize their job posts or have developed public exams for hiring 
employees. On the tools side, the utilization of regulatory quality standards (such as the use of cost-
benefit analysis to assess the impact of regulations) or performance-based payments for employees 
are practices that have been rarely implemented.  
 
The ERGI also considers the formal and informal aspects of agencies’ functioning: the association 
or lack thereof, between provisions in the agencies’ laws and regulations and the implementation 
and development of those frameworks. According to the ERGI, differences are not significant, but 
show higher levels of formal regulation compared to agencies’ practices. Transparency does not 
experience a significant disassociation, although there is a higher level of formal regulation 
compared to outcomes in agencies’ transparency practices. The largest differences are found in 
accountability, where even though agencies are subject to the control of both the Executive and the 
Parliament, actual practices show a stronger oversight of the former. 
 
The factors that cause low levels of informal accountability are the obligations of the agency vis-à-
vis the government and the agency’s reporting instruments. In the LAC region, electricity regulatory 
agencies are subject to stronger controls by the Executive branch than by the Parliament. Despite 
the fact that the majority of the agencies are accountable to both branches, the Executive has overall 
more interaction with the agency. The negative score for an agency that is fully accountable to the 
Executive is based on our benchmark, the US independent regulator model, where the government 
is responsible for policy formulation and the Parliament has the oversight role. There are also poor 
results for informal accountability of electricity agencies in terms of reporting instruments. Whereas 
in the independent regulator model, agencies are subject to the public hearings of their directors 
before the Parliament and also must draft annual reports to inform the Parliament and the general 
public, in the LAC region agencies are obliged to follow only one reporting approach, and there are 
only a few cases where agencies are subject to this double requirement. 
 
As previously indicated, we do not consider formal and informal aspects of the “tool” variable. This 
variable reflects the actual use of agencies’ instruments and only its informal side is considered. 
 
4.2 Country analysis: 
 
The previous section allowed us to determine the regulatory governance quality of electricity 
regulatory agencies in the LAC region and the region’s status in each of the variables. The ERGI 
also allows us to determine the ranking of LAC countries. Figure 6 represents the positions of LAC 
agencies in the ERGI. We distinguish three tiers or groups of countries. Tier 1, which includes 
countries that are above T1 in the graphs, encompasses agencies that have “desirable” conditions to 
develop good regulatory governance. Agencies’ responses in this tier are close to the highest value 
for each of the questions. It reflects an institutional design characterized by high standards of 
governance in autonomy, transparency, accountability, and tools. Tier 2, countries that are between 
T1 and T2 in the different graphs, encompasses agencies that only meet the minimum conditions 
that we consider necessary to implement the independent regulator model. It reflects an institutional 
design that we believe needs to be at least in place to guarantee acceptable levels of regulatory 
  - 16 -governance. Agencies in Tier 2 have fewer responsibilities than those in T1 and lower levels of 
autonomy from the line minister. They also have less sophisticated mechanisms for publishing their 
decisions and policies. Tier 3, countries behind T2 in the different graphs, includes agencies that do 
not meet the minimum conditions to implement our benchmark model of regulatory governance. 
 
Among the nineteen countries included in the research, only Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil are the 
countries grouped above Tier 1. Very close to them, although under Tier 2, are Bolivia, Peru, and El 
Salvador. Countries in Tier 3 are Ecuador, Chile, and Honduras. The rest of the countries belong to 
Tier 2.  




Table 2 represents countries’ positions and scores in the ERGI and in the Autonomy, Transparency, 
Accountability, and Tools Indexes. Consistently with the regional analysis, autonomy is the variable 
with the highest score for Tier 2 and Tier 3 countries, with a slight difference towards accountability 
in the case of countries above T1. Bolivia’s Superintendencia de Electricidad, Nicaragua’s 
Comision Nacional de Energia, and the Dominican Republic’s Superintendencia de Electricidad 
have the highest score (0.95). Chile (considering both the Comision Nacional de Energia and the 
Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles) is the country with the lowest level of autonomy 
in electricity regulatory governance design (0.28).  
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Table 2: Country rankings in the ERGI and four Indexes 
ERGI AUTONOMY  TRANSPARENCY  ACCOUNTABILITY  TOOLS 
 
Position Score Position Score  Position  Score Position  Score  Position  Score 
Argentina  7  0.80  6  0.85  8  0.71  10  0.71  8  0.83 
Barbados  8  0.76  10  0.82  8  0.71  4  0.83  10  0.59 
Bolivia  3  0.84  1  0.912  5  0.80  3  0.84  4  0.78 
Brazil  2  0.85  5  0.87  6  0.79  2  0.87  2  0.90 
Chile  18  0.56  19  0.57  12  0.63  16  0.50  12  0.52 
Colombia  9  0.75  18  0.67  5  0.8  6  0.79  7  0.71 
Costa Rica  12  0.74  8  0.84  7  0.74  10  0.71  10  0.59 
D. Republic  10  0.75  3  0.90  8  0.71  8  0.74  12  0.51 
Ecuador  17  0.60  17  0.70  15  0.57  12  0.65  13  0.40 
El Salvador  5  0.82  7  0.84  2  0.86  5  0.81  7  0.71 
Guatemala  6  0.79  12  0.80  13  0.62  2  0.87  1  0.93 
Honduras  19  0.56  16  0.70  16  0.53  14  0.54  14  0.37 
Jamaica  15  0.72  14  0.78  10  0.68  13  0.62  3  0.86 
Mexico  14  0.72  15  0.75  4  0.83  7  0.75  14  0.37 
Nicaragua  11  0.74  2  0.91  11  0.66  9  0.72  9  0.63 
Panama  16  0.63  11  0.81  14  0.59  15  0.52  11  0.54 
Peru  4  0.83  4  0.90  3  0.85  7  0.75  3  0.86 
T & T  1  0.88  9  0.82  1  0.92  1  0.97  5  0.76 
Uruguay  13  0.72  13  0.80  9  0.69  11  0.67  6  0.72 
 
 
Six distinctive factors in autonomy explain the lower scores achieved by countries at the bottom 
compared to countries at the top of the ERGI: 1) the institutional status of the agency: although in 
all the countries regulatory agencies are a separate entity from the line ministry, agencies with low 
scores in autonomy lack legal independence from the government (particularly in the cases of 
Mexico and Chile); 2) the joint regulation of the sector between the agency and the Executive or the 
Congress (Chile and Mexico); 3) the limited extent of the agency’s regulatory powers (in the cases 
of Uruguay and Mexico, the agency lacks pricing powers and the minister approves tariffs); 4) the 
minister’s responsibilities in terms of the main regulatory issues (in the particular cases of Chile, 
Mexico, and Uruguay, the agency does not have final decision power on tariffs and companies’ 
investment plans); 5) the appointment of the Board of Directors by the President without the 
intervention of the Parliament; and 6) the level of government funds in the budget (in both Chile 
and Mexico the agency’s budget is composed exclusively of government funds; in Uruguay, 
although the electricity provider is a state-owned company, the agency charges a regulation tax to 
the electricity companies).  
 
In the case of Chile, its low position in autonomy is explained not only by the regulatory power of 
the ministry in tariff regulation but also by the high involvement of political authorities in the 
agency’s decision-making. For instance, the Board of Chile’s Comisión Nacional de Energía is 
composed of different ministries and headed by the minister of energy. Market liberalization does 
not explain agencies’ institutional design in this country. Despite the unbundling of the sector in 
1980, the intervention of government authorities in regulatory issues is still as important as in 
countries that have not privatized their public companies (e.g. Mexico and Uruguay). The 
governance design of Chile’s regulatory agencies seems to be more linked to the country’s 
institutional traditions than to the particular policies that shaped its electricity sector.  
 
Accountability is the second highest variable with a regional score of 0.73. Trinidad and Tobago’s 
Regulated Industries Commission is the agency with the highest score (0.97) and Chile (considering 
Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database. The World Bank. 2007 both the Comisión Nacional de Energía and the Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles) 
is the country with the lowest level of accountability (0.50).  
 
The main difference between best and worst performers in accountability is the heavier obligations 
to the Executive of the latter. Countries at the top of the ERGI, with the exception of Bolivia and 
Peru, have a more balanced distribution of obligations between the Executive and the Parliament 
and are not fully accountable to the Executive. In contrast, countries at the bottom of the ERGI are 
heavily dependent on the Executive, to which they are, in most of the cases, fully accountable. 
 
Transparency is the third variable in order of prevalence with a regional score of 0.72. Trinidad and 
Tobago’s Regulated Industries Commission is the agency with the highest score (0.92) and 
Honduras’ Comisión Nacional de Energía is the agency with the lowest performance (0.53).  
 
Differences are not significant between best and worst performers in transparency, with the 
exception of Ecuador among the latter. Both best and worst performers have collective decision-
making structures, mechanisms to allow the participation of their stakeholders in their rule-making 
processes, adequate mechanisms to report their activities to the required institutions and to publish 
their annual reports. The only aspect in which worst performer countries show lower scores is in 
public consultations. Neither Mexico’s National Regulatory Energy Commission nor any of Chile’s 
regulatory agencies conduct public consultations. In the case of Mexico, public consultations are 
conducted by the Federal Commission for Regulatory Improvement (Comisión Federal de Mejora 
Regulatoria, COFEMER). Ecuador’s electricity regulatory commission is the agency with the worst 
performance in transparency. Its main weaknesses lie in the instruments used to improve 
institutional development, such as the publication of its annual report, the use of public exams to 
hire employees, and the publication of job vacancies.  
 
Among the best performer countries, Trinidad and Tobago’s agency has the highest level (0.92) of 
transparency in the region. The rest of the countries score approximately 0.8. Among the worst 
performers, Mexico has the highest results (0.83), followed by Uruguay, Chile, and Ecuador.  
 
In the results for the region, “tools” is the variable where countries, regardless of ranking, have their 
lowest scores. This variable is not only a measure of tools related to the application of the agencies’ 
regulatory policies such as benchmarking or the methodology for tariff revision, but also of   
instruments aimed at improving institutional and managerial quality (e.g., the publication of the 
agency’s annual report or the use of performance-based payments). Guatemala’s Comisión 
Nacional de Energía Eléctrica is the agency with the highest ranking for tools (0.93) and both 
Honduras’  Comisión Nacional de Energía and Mexico’s Comisión Nacional Reguladora de 
Energía have the lowest scores for this variable. 
 
The main factors that explain the differences between best and worst performers in terms of the 
tools variable are: 1) the use of benchmarking; 2) the extent and number of regulatory instruments; 
3) the publication of the agency’s annual report; 4) the registration of users’ claims; 5) the 
utilization of regulatory quality standards; and 6) the existence of a structure of posts and salaries. 
 
4.3 Variables’ analysis: 
 
This part of the paper disaggregates the variables: Autonomy is broken down into political, 
managerial, and regulatory autonomy; transparency into social and institutional transparency; and 
tools into regulatory and institutional tools. Accountability considers only an institutional 
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(Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) and no further division is made of its different indicators. 
 
The dissection of the variables into different elements gives a better picture of the composition of 
each category and the position of the agencies in each of the indexes that represent them. It is also 
useful to compare agencies’ scores in the variables indexes (e.g., the Autonomy Index) and their 
performance in each of their components (e.g., the Political Autonomy Index). 
 
We conduct a three-level analysis of each variable. First, we define the governance variable and 
identify countries’ position in the index. Second, we compare countries’ position in the main 
variable and the scores in the different components of that variable. A third level of analysis 
consists of analyzing the formal and informal dimensions of autonomy, transparency, and 
accountability. In all the three level of analysis we also make use of our ¨Tiers¨ approach. The 
variable “tools” is excluded from the formal vs. informal analysis. The mere existence of the 




The autonomy variable considers the procedures, mechanisms, and instruments aimed at 
guaranteeing the independence of the agency from political authorities (political autonomy), the 
autonomous administration of its resources (managerial autonomy), and the regulation of the sector 
(regulatory autonomy). Its indicators reflect both formal and informal regulation capturing a wide 
range of aspects related to the autonomy of the agency. The variable is represented by the 
Autonomy Index, which gives us the scores of LAC electricity agencies. 
 




















































































Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.














Tier 1 shows countries with a “desirable” governance level to guarantee an autonomous functioning 
of the agency. Countries grouped under Tier 2 are those that meet those requirements we consider 
minimum to achieve a certain degree of autonomy in its functioning. Finally, countries in Tier 3, 
below T2, are those that lack the minimum preconditions to carry out their roles as autonomous 
agencies.  
 
Agencies below T2 are those in Colombia and Chile. The positions of Chile and Colombia among 
countries below T2 levels are mainly explained by the weight of the government in the decision-
making process of the agencies. In both countries, particularly at the level of the agencies with the 
  - 20 -main regulatory responsibilities (Comisión Nacional de Energía), the Board of Directors is 
composed of sector ministers and headed by the line minister.
5
F Moreover, in both countries, the 
heads of the agencies in charge of the enforcement of quality standards and consumer complaints 
(Superintendencia) are also appointed and removed by the President with no involvement of other 
institutions. These factors differentiate Chile and Colombia from other countries of the region in 
which the Board is composed of members that are not policy formulator’s authorities. Nevertheless, 
this observation is a reflection on the design of the agency and does not speak about the real impact 
of government in the agency’s decision-making, which is especially addressed in the Informal 
Autonomy Index. In our framework, we assume that an agency whose Board is composed of 
ministers will tend to be less independent from the government than an agency that is integrated by 
non-public official members. 
 
A. Political  autonomy: 
 
This element of an agency’s autonomy reflects the level of independence of the agency from 
political authorities. Its focus is on the independence of the agency’s decision-making from 
authorities in charge of policy formulation, namely the line minister. It includes issues such as the 
mechanism to select agencies’ directors, the renewability of directors’ mandates, the number of 
directors that have not completed their terms, the reasons directors leave their positions, the 
interference of the minister in the agency’s decisions, and the composition of the agency’s budget. 
 
























































































The Political Autonomy Index has the largest number of countries among Tier 3 agencies. It could 
be understood from this finding that the independence of agencies from political authorities is the 
most significant deficiency of agencies in terms of their autonomy. Only Brazil is among Tier1 
countries. 
 
Tier 3 countries present a wide variety of agencies. There are agencies from which we would expect 
their positioning among T3 such as Ecuador, Honduras, and Chile. Nevertheless, countries with a 
good overall performance in the ERGI and the Autonomy Index such as Trinidad and Tobago and 
Argentina are also part of this group of agencies. 
 
                                                 
TP
5
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 In the case of Colombia’s Comisión de Regulación de Gas y Energía, the Board is also composed of five experts 
appointed by the President of the country. The scores of best performers in the Political Autonomy Index significantly differ from countries at 
the bottom of that index. These results stem from both institutional and factual aspects of agencies 
regulatory governance. The agencies of Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia are designed 
with a separate status from the line ministry, a clear separation of roles between the agency and the 
government authorities, and a budget composed exclusively of a regulation tax charged to 
electricity companies. Directors leave mostly due to retirement, voluntary leave, or the completion 
of their appointments, and the line minister, according to the opinions of the agency, has a low level 
of influence on the agency’s affairs. 
 
The factors distinguishing countries at the bottom of the Political Autonomy Index are also due to 
both issues of institutional design and agencies’ practices. Among the former, Colombia and Chile’s 
regulatory agencies, namely their National Energy Commissions, are separate entities but with no 
autonomy from the line minister. Moreover, the sector ministry is part of both agencies, and heads 
their Boards. In both countries, directors are appointed by the President, with Chile’s National 
Energy Commission Board composed only of ministers (in Colombia’s National Energy and Gas 
Regulatory Commission, the Board is also integrated by experts). Finally, in the cases of both 
Chile’s National Energy Commission and the Superintendencia de Electricidad and Colombia’s 
Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos, their budgets are composed exclusively of government 
funds without any type of income from electricity companies (regulation tax). The exception to this 
is the case of Colombia’s National Energy and Gas Commission, whose budget is entirely funded 
by a regulation tax charged to electricity providers. 
 
Among the practices that characterize the agencies of the worst performers on the Political 
Autonomy Index, the main factors are the intervention of ministers in the agencies’ decision-
making and the times and reasons directors have left the agencies’ Boards. In the cases of Chile and 
Colombia’s National Commissions, the line minister is part of the agency and, hence, of its 
decision-making. In the case of Ecuador’s Consejo Nacional de Energía Eléctrica (CONELEC), the 
sector minister can give instructions to the agency on issues related to the country’s energy policy. 
In terms of the reasons directors leave the agency, in both Chile and Colombia directors are 
ministers who are appointed and dismissed by the President, without the intervention of other 
authorities. In Ecuador, one of the main reasons cited for directors leaving their positions is external 
pressure. Moreover, since the creation of CONELEC in 1999, twenty directors have left their 
positions (the highest number of directors leaving their positions out of any LAC electricity 
regulatory agency). 
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Managerial autonomy involves the freedom of the agency to determine the use of its budget and the 
organization of its resources. It includes aspects such as the ability of the agency to determine its 
organizational structure, the freedom to make its own decisions on personnel, the financial 
autonomy to determine its own expenses, and the type of legal regime that applies to its employees 
(private law, civil service law, or both). It also includes other aspects related to tools that contribute 
to improving its management, such as the existence of its own structure of posts and salaries and of 







































































































Countries’ rankings in managerial autonomy are reflected in the Managerial Autonomy Index. 
Jamaica, Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru, and Barbados are among those 
countries with desirable conditions to manage its resources. These agencies show the existence of 
adequate mechanisms and procedures to guarantee an autonomous administration of the agency by 
its authorities. On the contrary, Colombia, Chile, and Honduras, in that order, are the countries with 
less managerial freedom and where the space of the agency to decide its organizational structure 
and the use of its resources is limited. 
 
Results in this section are not an indication of the effectiveness of the agency’s management, but of 
powers aimed at allowing the agency an autonomous administration. This is particularly the case of 
Chile, whose public sector bureaucracy is, according to several governance indicators
6, well-trained 
and based on meritocracy  
 
Countries at the top of the index have full powers in all the aspects mentioned in the first paragraph. 
Brazil is among the leading countries in managerial autonomy, emerging from the middle of the 
Autonomy Index with Jamaica, Guatemala, and Argentina. In contrast, agencies at the bottom of the 
index lack the autonomy to determine their organizational structures and do not have the power to 
                                                 
6 According to World Bank’s Governance Effectiveness indicator, Chile heads the LAC region in terms of the quality 
of its policy-making. The Governance Effectiveness index measures the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. It is the result of a large number 
of individual data sources that provide information on perceptions on governance (Kauffman, 2006). 
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 freely establish the use of their resources. In terms of the regime that regulates their employees, they 
generally lack their own structure of posts and salaries and do not utilize incentives to determine 
their payments.  
 
C. Regulatory  Autonomy: 
 
This dimension of agency’s autonomy is represented by the extension of the agency’s regulatory 
powers. It includes characteristics such as the institution responsible for the regulation of the sector 
(the agency, Parliament, the Executive or some combination among them); the type of the agency’s 
powers (consultative, oversight, pricing, and rule-making); the agency’s responsibilities regarding 
particular issues (tariffs, service quality, consumer complaints, companies’ investment plans, 
wholesale market, anti-competitive behavior, technical standards); and the agency’s powers to 
enforce its decisions.  
 
Performance in regulatory autonomy is represented 
in the Regulatory Autonomy Index. The majority of 
countries of the region are in Tier 1, with only four 
countries below T2. Countries at the top of the 
index are Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Brazil. Countries with the lowest 
scores are Mexico, Honduras, Uruguay, and 
Jamaica. 
Figure 10: Regulatory Autonomy Index 
 
Countries at the top of the Autonomy Index keep 
their high positions in the Regulatory Autonomy 
Index, with the exception of Panama who ascends 
several places from the Autonomy Index and 
becomes the top ranking country. Chile improves its 
position in the Regulatory Autonomy Index compared to its score in the Autonomy Index. Both 
Chile and Colombia improve their low scores in political autonomy, joining those countries in the 
























































































The improvement of Chile in the Regulatory Autonomy Index is explained by the extension of 
agencies’ regulatory powers. Although the CNE does not determine tariff levels, it has an important 
role in the regulation of the sector, enough powers to enforce their decisions, and responsibilities in 
other regulatory issues such as service quality and technical standards. 
 
Countries with desirable conditions in the Regulatory Autonomy Index such as Panama, Nicaragua, 
and El Salvador have full responsibilities for areas such as tariffs, service quality, standards, and 
investments, as well as the power to implement sanctions and regulations. By contrast, countries 
that do not meet the minimum requirements in terms of the extension of their regulatory 
prerogatives have little responsibility for specific regulatory issues and no powers to enforce 
regulations. For instance, Uruguay’s Unidad Reguladora de Servicios de Energía y Agua and 
Mexico’s  Comisión Reguladora de Energía have oversight only on issues related to consumer 
complaints, service quality, and anti-competitive behavior, and lack authority in areas such as tariffs 
and companies’ investment plans. Moreover, Honduras and Jamaica do not have the ability to 
enforce their decisions, reducing their capacity to effectively regulate the sector. 
 
It is interesting to observe that there is not necessarily a relationship between the scores in political 
and regulatory autonomy. Although the best performers in political autonomy (Brazil, Dominican 
  - 24 -Republic, Nicaragua, and Bolivia) did not significantly change their positions in the Regulatory 
Autonomy Index, some countries in the middle and lowest positions of the Political Autonomy 
Index experienced a significant improvement in their standing in the Regulatory Autonomy Index.  
This was particularly the case for Panama, Guatemala, Colombia, and Chile. Panama leads the 
Regulatory Autonomy Index with the maximum score (1.00), leaving its middle position in political 
autonomy (0.68). Guatemala experiences a notorious improvement that places it among the leading 
countries in regulatory autonomy (0.92), leaving its middle position in political autonomy (0.66). 
Finally, both Colombia and Chile leave their places as worst performers in political autonomy (0.53 
and 0.40, respectively), reaching an average score of 0.76 in the Regulatory Autonomy Index.  
 
The changes experienced by regulatory agencies in political vs. regulatory autonomy explains the 
importance of linking political independence to the expansion of the agencies’ regulatory powers. In 
other words, an agency can have the highest level of independence from political authorities, but no 
relevant powers in the regulation of the sector, making independence an abstract characteristic of 
the agency’s functioning with no real impact on regulation. The same conclusion was observed in 
an assessment of European electricity regulators, where it was found that even if regulatory 
agencies shared the same regulatory objectives, there were significant variations in the means the 
regulators have to pursue to achieve those objectives (Johannsen, 2003). 
 
D.  Formal vs. Informal:  
 
It was previously said that there were no significant differences between the formal and informal 
elements of agencies’ autonomy at the regional level. At the specific agency level, only Uruguay’s 
Unidad Reguladora de Servicios de Energía y Agua and Ecuador’s Consejo Nacional de 
Electricidad experience a variation between the formal and informal aspects of their autonomy. 
Uruguay significantly improves upon its formal autonomy position (0.67), becoming the best 
performer in the Informal Autonomy Index (0.93). On the other hand, Ecuador experiences a 
significant drop from its formal autonomy score (0.82), becoming the worst performer in the 
Informal Autonomy Index (0.54).  
 























































































































































































There is not necessarily a relationship between the indicators of formal and informal elements of 
agencies’ autonomy. Indicators of formal autonomy represent several aspects of an agency’s 
political, managerial, and regulatory autonomy. Indicators of informal autonomy are mostly 
represented by political autonomy characteristics. Hence, the presence of Uruguay and Ecuador at 
the top and bottom, respectively, of the informal autonomy index might explain the degree of actual 
  - 25 -independence of the agency from political authorities. The low position of Uruguay in the Formal 
Autonomy Index may reflect an institutional design that lacks provisions to guarantee the political 
independence of the agency (which, according to the informal index, is quite high) or ensure the 
autonomous management of its resources; or it may reflect the existence of limited regulatory 





Transparency includes the procedures, mechanisms, and instruments aimed at guaranteeing the 
disclosure and publication of relevant regulatory and institutional information, the participation of 
stakeholders in the agency’s regulatory decisions and decision-making, and the application of rules 
aimed at governing the integrity and behavior of agency officials. It has a regional average of 0.69.  
 




















































































Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.














Leading countries in the Transparency Index are Trinidad and Tobago, El Salvador, Peru, and 
Mexico. Countries at the bottom are Panama, Ecuador, and Honduras. Results indicate a slight 
preference of electricity agencies in the LAC region for procedures and instruments aimed at 
allowing the involvement of non-institutional stakeholders and their access to agency decision-
making and information (social transparency), as opposed to the use by agencies of procedures and 
tools to improve institutional transparency. Social transparency obtains an average of 0.76, 
compared to 0.64 for institutional transparency.  
 
The division of countries in three tiers allows us to see that only Trinidad and Tobago meets the 
criteria to be included among agencies with a desirable level of transparency. Most countries in the 
region only meet the minimum conditions to guarantee the access of the different stakeholders to 
the agency’s information and its regulatory making and the transparent management of its resources 
(for instance, the publication of its job vacancies). Panama, Ecuador, and Honduras do not even 
meet the necessary conditions to guarantee its transparency. 
 
 
A. Social  Transparency: 
 
The social aspects of transparency are related to the involvement of stakeholders in the agency’s 
decision and rule-making processes and their access to the agency’s information. Social 
  - 26 -transparency includes issues such as the participation of stakeholders in the agency’s rule-making 
process, the publication by the agency of its decisions, the organization by the agency of public 
consultations, the existence of advisory committees in the agency’s structure, the existence of a 
website, and the registration of users’ claims. 
 
 




















































































Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.














Agencies’ positions in social transparency are represented in the Social Transparency Index (Figure 
14). The index is headed by Trinidad and Tobago and followed by Colombia, the Dominican 
Republic, Peru, El Salvador, and Bolivia. Countries at the bottom of the index are Jamaica and 
Chile. Among countries at the top of the index, only Trinidad and Tobago and Colombia meet the 
conditions to develop “desirable” levels of social transparency. On the other hand, Nicaragua, 
Panama, and Ecuador do not meet the minimum conditions that allow users an appropriate access to 
the agency’s information and their involvement in their regulatory-making process. 
 
Leading countries in the Transparency Index keep relatively similar positions in social transparency, 
with the exception of the Dominican Republic, which significantly improves its score in social 
transparency. By contrast, countries at the bottom of the Transparency Index—namely Ecuador and 
Honduras—show significantly improved positions in the Social Transparency Index. 
 
Differences between countries at the top and bottom of the Social Transparency Index center on 
three main aspects. The first aspect is the participation of the stakeholders in the agency’s rule-
making process. While public consultations or public hearings are aimed at allowing the 
involvement of stakeholders in the agency’s main decisions, the rule-making process is the 
mechanism through which the regulatees are invited to contribute with their opinions in the 
elaboration of the agency’s regulations. Contrary to countries at the top, countries at the bottom of 
the Social Transparency Index either lack provisions to involve stakeholders in the rule-making 
process or, even though these provisions exist, stakeholders do not actually get involved in that 
process.  
 
The second aspect is the existence of advisory committees integrated by different stakeholders in 
the structures of best performing agencies. These committees are supposed to play an important role 
in the agency’s decision-making by representing and promoting different group interests (mainly 
consumers).  
 
  - 27 -The third and last aspect is the registration of users’ claims. Best performing agencies register 
consumer claims through both paper-based and electronic mechanisms, allowing a faster resolution 
of the user’s case and easier access to those files by the regulatees (at both the agency and through 
the website). By contrast, countries at the bottom of the Social Transparency Index register users’ 
claims through paper-based mechanisms, preventing the modernization of the agency’s mechanisms 
to resolve users’ complaints. 
 
It is interesting to observe the different behavior of Chile and Colombia in terms of transparency. 
Although they share a similar design of their regulatory institutions
7 and similar levels of 
autonomy, Colombia significantly surpasses Chile in its level of transparency. This factor allows us 
to highlight the openness of the Colombian electricity agency’s governance, despite its vulnerability 
to government interference. 
 
B. Institutional  transparency: 
 
The second dimension of transparency, institutional transparency, is composed of indicators related 
to the transparent management of the agency that are not directly linked to the involvement of the 
sector’s stakeholders. It includes aspects such as the nature of the agency’s decision-making 
(collective or individual), the existence of quarantine rules for directors, the agency’s reporting 
instruments (annual report and public hearing before the Congress), the publication of the agency’s 
institutional strategy and annual report, the publication of the agency’s audit accounts and of its 
career posts, the existence of norms of ethics, the record of the Board’s meetings, and the use of 
public exams to hire employees. 
 




















































































Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.














Countries at both the top and the bottom of the Transparency Index keep similar positions in the 
Institutional Transparency Index. Peru and Trinidad and Tobago are countries with “desirable” 
levels of institutional transparency, obtaining the best scores. Countries under tier 3, particularly 
Panama, Honduras, and Ecuador do not meet the minimum levels considered in the ERGI for a 
transparent management of the agency’s resources and activities.  
 
                                                 
TP
7
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 Each has a National Energy Commission in charge of the main aspects of regulation and some policy formulation 
responsibilities, and a Superintendencia as an oversight entity in charge of sanctioning and consumer complaints. Several factors cause agencies to be positioned at the top of the index. The first factor is related to 
the existence of collective decision-making composed of a Board of Directors. As opposed to a 
single decision-making structure, a Board composed of directors with varied technical backgrounds 
allows more comprehensive and diverse debates on regulatory issues than a decision-making by a 
single policy maker. The second factor is related to the publication of information such as job 
vacancies, an annual report, an institutional strategy, and audited accounts. Finally, a record of the 
Board’s meetings and the existence of quarantine rules for directors that leave the agency also 
contribute to the high performance of countries at the top of the index. 
 
Agencies with good performance in institutional transparency tend to possess characteristics related 
to administrative modernization. For instance, the publication of the organization’s institutional 
strategy, annual report, and job vacancies are indicators of agencies concerned not only with sector-
based policies related to transparency (such as the conducting of public hearings) but also with 
mechanisms and procedures aimed at making them more effective as administrative bodies. 
 
Chile achieves its second highest performance in institutional transparency (ninth place) relative to 
its position in the other indexes. Despite the strong intervention of government authorities in Chile’s 
agencies, one cannot overlook the bureaucratic quality of its public administration. In fact, Chile 
heads the region in Government Effectiveness, a governance indicator developed by the World 
Bank to measure the quality of a country’s bureaucracy. 
8
 
C. Formal  vs.  informal: 
 
There are no significant regional variations between the formal and informal dimensions of 
agencies’ transparency. Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica, and Mexico are the countries that show the largest disparities. Bolivia, the Dominican 
Republic, and Guatemala are countries with higher levels of informal transparency compared to 
their scores in the formal transparency index. However, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and 
Mexico show lower levels of informal transparency compared to their performances in the formal 
aspects of the variable. 
 
   





















































































































































































                                                 
8 The World Bank Government Effectiveness indicator measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. It is the result of a large number 
of individual data sources that provide information on perceptions on governance (Kauffman, 2006). 
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 The disassociations between the formal and informal aspects of agencies’ mechanisms and 
procedures to achieve transparency might be explained by two factors: 1) not all agencies’ 
procedures translate into practice (for instance, the mere existence of the agency’s annual report vs. 
its publication on the agency’s website or bulletin); and 2) the agency has developed good practices 
of transparency that are not established in the agency’s statute or the electricity law. This is the case 
of Bolivia and Guatemala, whose positions drastically change from formal to informal transparency. 
Bolivia moves from a score of 0.7 in formal transparency to the first place in informal transparency 
(0.9). Guatemala leaves the last position in the formal transparency index (0.5) to reach the sixth 
place (0.75) in the Informal Transparency Index. 
 
Consistent with the Transparency Index, Trinidad and Tobago heads the Formal Transparency 





Accountability was not disaggregated into different aspects. Its indicators represent different 
institutional elements (e.g. reporting obligations to the Executive and the Parliament and ability to 
appeal its decisions before the Executive and the Judiciary) of the agency’s relationships with the 
Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary. Hence, we only considered the institutional aspect of 
agencies’ accountability design. 
 
Our benchmark of analysis gives higher scores to the dual accountability of the agency to the 
Executive and the Legislative, with stronger influence of the latter. Moreover, it emphasizes the 
appeal of the agency’s decisions before the judiciary, giving a lower score to agencies whose 
decisions need a previous denial from the Executive before the judicial review. 
 



































































































Trinidad and Tobago is the only country in Tier 1, showing a desirable governance design and 
practices to keep the agency accountable to institutional actors. Different from other indexes, there 
are a vast number of countries that are under Tier 3. Chile, Panama, and Honduras are the countries 
with the lowest results. The situation of Chile among Tier 3 countries might be due to the oversight 
of the agency by the Executive and not the Parliament. Nevertheless, we do not make a judgment 
regarding the effectiveness of Chile’s accountability mechanism. We limit our assessment to 
establish whether agencies are subject to stronger controls by the Executive or the Legislative, 
  - 30 -assuming that in LAC countries a deeper level of accountability to the Executive might affect the 




A. Formal  vs.  informal: 
 
The formal aspects of agencies’ accountability reflect the existence of agencies’ internal and 
external (Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches) structures for accountability, while informal 
aspects are related to the implementation of provisions in their statutes or laws. For instance, while 
question 51 of the ERGI asks the agency whether it is accountable to the Executive or the 
Legislative branch, question 52 of the ERGI explores the actual reporting obligations of the 
agencies before one or the other branches of government. 
 
Disparities between the formal and informal aspects of accountability are the largest among all 
variables. As mentioned previously, the driving factors of those disparities are the types of reporting 
instruments the agency must use and the types of obligations of the regulator before the Executive 
and the Legislative. It is important to highlight that the ERGI is oriented towards an accountability 
mechanism based on legislative control over the agency, with only informational reporting 
obligations to the Executive. Hence, an agency will achieve a higher score in the informal 
accountability index if it is fully accountable to the Legislative and only subject to informative 
reporting obligations to the Executive. Also, and in connection with the agencies’ reporting 
instruments, the ERGI gives higher scores to an accountability scheme that combines hearing 
obligations before the Parliament with an annual report of its performance. 
 
 









































































































































































Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.
Informal Accountability Index
  
Countries at the top of the Formal Accountability Index have only informational reporting 
obligations to the Executive and, particularly in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, the obligation to 
submit a report that must be approved by the Parliament. Their agencies are also required to submit 
an annual report and their directors are subject to public hearings before the Congress. Countries 
that do not meet the minimum requirements to implement this accountability scheme are the 
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Honduras, Chile, and Uruguay. 
 
When it comes to the practices that characterize agencies’ accountability, only two countries, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Guatemala, are among agencies with desirable levels of informal 
  - 31 -accountability. Particularly significant is the number of countries that is below the minimum 
conditions to implement appropriate procedures of accountability. Among them, countries with the 
lowest levels of informal accountability are Chile and Panama. In the case of Chile, both agencies 
(the National Energy Commission and the Electricity and Gas Supervision Agency) are fully 
accountable to the Executive, only reporting through annual reports. Panama’s performance in the 
informal accountability index is also explained by its accountability to the Executive and the use of 
just an annual report for that obligation. Furthermore
 
conditions to implement appropriate procedures of accountability. Among them, countries with the 
lowest levels of informal accountability are Chile and Panama. In the case of Chile, both agencies 
(the National Energy Commission and the Electricity and Gas Supervision Agency) are fully 
accountable to the Executive, only reporting through annual reports. Panama’s performance in the 
informal accountability index is also explained by its accountability to the Executive and the use of 



















































































Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.
Tools/Capacity Index
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The fourth variable of analysis is the Tools Index, which encompasses the instruments available to 
agencies to perform their duties
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Among the different countries that compose the index, only Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and 
Jamaica qualify as countries in Tier 1 of the Index. With different degrees, they meet “desirable” 
tools and procedures to achieve a good regulatory management. On the contrary, Ec
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    Figure 21: Tools Index 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
It is interesting to highlight that Colombia and Chile improve their previous positions compared to 
other indexes such as autonomy. This fact can be explained by the emphasis given by these agencies 
to develop regulatory capacities and
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In order to assess agencies’ performance in this variable, we divided its indicators into two 
components. The first component, regulatory tools, includes instruments related to the conduct of 
regulatory policies. It includes mechanisms such as benchmarking, the methodology for tariff 
revision, and instruments that regulate consumers’ rights. The second component, institutional tools, 
involves instruments aimed at improving the institutional development of the agency’s management 
and its decisions. It includes mechanisms such as regulatory quality standards, public consultations, 
the structure of posts and salaries, performance-based salaries (incentives) for employees, the use of 
 
In order to assess agencies’ performance in this variable, we divided its indicators into two 
components. The first component, regulatory tools, includes instruments related to the conduct of 
regulatory policies. It includes mechanisms such as benchmarking, the methodology for tariff 
revision, and instruments that regulate consumers’ rights. The second component, institutional tools, 
involves instruments aimed at improving the institutional development of the agency’s management 
and its decisions. It includes mechanisms such as regulatory quality standards, public consultations, 
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Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.
Regulatory Tools Index
 website, the mechanisms to register consumer complaints, the agency’s annual report and 
stitutional strategy, and employees’ training. 
g, 
ainly to determine tariffs, is used in 78 percent of the region, with a smaller percentage of 
ountries having the full complement  question 73 of the survey). 
 and Brazil achieve full score leading those countries grouped in Tier 1. Mexico is the only 
ountry that is in Tier 3 and which does not meet the minimum requirements demanded in this 
defining 
terconnection tariffs, and five-year revisions of these tools. Moreover, 90 percent of the countries 
n the electricity sector and the concentration of tariff determination 
owers in the sector ministry. A large percentage of the tools in the index are related to tariff 






A. Regulatory  tools: 
 
The region shows a better performance in regulatory than in institutional tools. Benchmarkin
m
c  of tools listed in the survey (See
 
















A significant number of countries are in Tier 1, reflecting the importance given by LAC agencies to 
the development of several tools to implement their regulatory decisions. Peru, Guatemala, El 
Salvador,
c
index.    
 
Leading countries in this index make use not only of benchmarking but also of tools to conduct 
regulatory policies such as a database for regulatory accountability, methodology for tariff revision, 
methodology for annual tariff readjustment, instruments for monitoring quality and technical 
standards, methodology for monitoring technical standards, methodology for 
in
in the region have developed specific legislation to regulate electricity consumers’ rights. 
 
Countries at the bottom of the index differ in their performances. While none of them make use of 
benchmarking, Ecuador and Chile achieve average scores in regulatory instruments with Mexico 
having the lowest results in this last indicator. The poor performance of Mexico in this aspect might 

























































































Source: LAC Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007.
Institutional Tools Index
 
tory tools than in those 
indicators grouped under institutional tools. Leading countries are Guatemala, Brazil, Jamaica, and 
Peru. Countries with the lowest scor
 
 
Figure 23: Institutional Tools Index 
 and have not developed 
stitutional strategies. In addition, the registration of consumer complaints is facilitated through 
tralized body of the 
ublic administration, the Federal Commission for Regulatory Improvement (COFEMER), which 
erforms cross-sectoral assessments on the impact of administrative decisions. 
ses to test the robustness of the Electricity Regulatory Governance Index 
RGI). Both exercises involved giving different weights to each of the variables of our regulatory 
ears 50 percent of the total weight of the index. The rationale to this approach 
B. Institutional  tools: 
 
As mentioned before, countries of the region present higher scores in regula















There are large disparities between countries at the top and the bottom of the index. Guatemala, 
Brazil, Jamaica, and Peru have certain regulatory quality standards tools (cost-benefit analysis, 
regulatory impact analysis, and administrative simplification), the full use of performance-based 
payments for their employees, the publication of both annual reports and institutional strategies and, 
with the exception of Peru, a structure of posts and salaries. By contrast, worst performing countries 
lack regulatory quality standards, do not use incentives for their employees,
in
paper-based mechanisms, not using electronic devices to perform that task. 
 
It is worth highlighting the use of regulatory impact analysis (RIA) by countries such as Mexico and 
Peru. In fact, Mexico’s regulatory impact analysis was praised by the OECD, which has considered 
the use of Mexican’s RIA as a benchmark in the management of cost-benefit analysis of regulations 





5. -   ROBUSTNESS: 
 




First, we assigned arbitrary weights to some variables. We assigned autonomy 40 percent of the 
total weight, and transparency, accountability, and tools were each given 20 percent. Moreover, 
within autonomy, the question related to tariff regulation (agency’s decision responsibilities in tariff 
structure and level) b
  - 34 -is to emphasize autonomy and, within autonomy, the regulation of tariffs, before other aspects of 
Table 3: Robustness analysis (with a different definition of weights) 
 




T. AND TOBAGO 0.91 T. AND TOBAGO 0.88
2 BRAZIL 0.88 BRAZIL 0.85
3 BOLIVIA 0.87 BOLIVIA 0.84
4 PERU 0.86 PERU 0.83
5 EL SALVADOR 0.85 EL SALVADOR 0.82
6 GUATEMALA 0.83 GUATEMALA 0.79
7 BARBADOS 0.8 ARGENTINA 0.77
8 COLOMBIA 0.8 BARBADOS 0.76
9 R. DOMINICANA 0.8 COLOMBIA 0.75
10 NICARAGUA 0.79 R. DOMINICANA 0.75
11 COSTA RICA 0.79 NICARAGUA 0.74
12 JAMAICA 0.77 COSTA RICA 0.74
13 ARGENTINA 0.72 URUGUAY 0.72
14 PANAMA 0.7 MEXICO 0.72
15 HONDURAS 0.64 JAMAICA 0.72
16 ECUADOR 0.58 PANAMA 0.63
17 URUGUAY 0.58 ECUADOR 0.6
18 MEXICO 0.57 CHILE 0.56
19 CHILE 0.44 HONDURAS 0.56  
 
Table 3 shows no significant variations between the results of the ERGI and the new index. 
Countries at the top of both indexes keep their same positions. The main differences took place in 
countries below T2 where Mexico and Uruguay joined Chile as countries with the lowest scores. 
he main reason behind this change is the focus on tariff regulation and the lack of regulatory 
. Furthermore, an additional advantage of PCA is that once you have 
und these patterns in the data, you may compress the data by reducing the dimensions, without 
T
competencies on this matter by electricity agencies in Mexico and Uruguay. 
 
The second exercise is more complex and it involved the use of Principal Component Analysis. 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) develops a composite index by defining a real valued 
function over the relevant variables objectively. The principle of this method lies in the fact that 
when different characteristics are observed about a set of events, the characteristic with higher 
variation explains a higher proportion of the variation in the dependent variable compared to a 
variable with lesser variation. Therefore, the issue is one of finding weights to be given to each of 
the concerned variables determined on the principle that the objective is to maximize the variation 
in the linear composite of these variables. In other words, this approach allows for identifying 
patterns in data, and expressing the data in such a way as to highlight their similarities and 
differences. Since patterns in data can be hard to find in data of high dimension, PCA may 
contribute in analyzing data
fo
much loss of information.   
 
We use PCA to jointly take into account the information provided by our eight main governance 
indicators ratios (Figure 4) and generate orthogonal indexes to measure regulatory agencies' 
governance. Factor scores were then calculated for each of the agencies, and these scores were used 
  - 35 -for comparing their governance. As a first step, we determine how many factors we may use in our 
analysis. Table 4 reports the estimated factors and their eigenvalues. Only those factors accounting 
for greater than 10 percent of the variance (eigenvalues >1) are kept in the analysis. As a result, 
e finally retained (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Eigenvalues of factors 
only the first three factors ar
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1 3.84 2.62 0.48 0.48
Factor 2 1.21 0.10 0.15 0.63
Factor 3 1.12 0.54 0.14 0.77
Factor 4 0.58 0.12 0.07 0.84
Factor 5 0.46 0.11 0.06 0.90
Factor 6 0.35 0.08 0.04 0.94
Factor 7 0.27 0.09 0.03 0.98
Factor 8 0.18 . 0.02 1.00  
 
Among them, the first principal component factor (F1) accounts for 48 percent of the variance of 
the seven indexes. The other two component factors (F2 and F3) account for 15 and 14 percent of 
the variance respectively. The three factors together account for 77 of the total variance. These 
factors allow for computing the factor score coefficient matrix. To enhance these factors' 
interpretability, we use the varimax factor rotation method to minimize the number of variables that 
have high loadings on a factor. In other words, varimax rotation produces results which make it the 
most likely to identify each variable with a single factor. This approach greatly enhances our ability 
 make substantive interpretation of the main factors. Table 5 presents the factor loadings, where 
tor are highlighted in bold. 
 
Table 5: Factor loadings of indexes after varimax rotation 
ormal Autonomy Index 0.122 -0.003 0.629 0.199
ormal Transparency Index 0.687 0.046 -0.149 0.173
to
variables with large loadings (N>0.4) for a given fac
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Unexplained
Tariff regulation Index -0.078 0.019 0.702 0.188
Informal Autonomy Index -0.162 0.499 0.147 0.310
Informal Transparency Index 0.228 0.447 -0.083 0.274
Informal Accountability Index 0.116 0.504 -0.099 0.294
Tools/Capacities Index -0.110 0.538 0.049 0.288
F
F
Formal Accountability Index 0.635 -0.080 0.220 0.108  
 
As seen on Table 5, Factor 1 reflects formal aspects of regulatory governance and is highly 
correlated with formal transparency and formal accountability. As this factor explains almost half of 
the variance in the data, it constitutes the most informative indicator of the agencies’ governance. 
Factor 2 reflects informal aspects of governance as it is correlated with informal autonomy, 
informal transparency, informal accountability, and tools and capacities. Factor 3 reflects formal 
spects of autonomy and the formal power of the agency to determining tariff’s structure and level. 
                                                
a
This factor is highly correlated with the tariff regulation and the Formal Autonomy Index.  
 
In order to facilitate analysis and interpretation, we further standardize the factors scores assigned to 
each agency along the 0-10 scale
9. In addition, we develop an aggregate index composed of the 








X X i  
  - 36 -where higher values indicate higher governance in a given factor and in the aggregate index. As we 
did in the previous sections we distinguish three tiers or groups of countries. Hence, we divide 
agencies among those with desirable conditions to develop good regulatory governance (T1) and 
elow which agencies show serious deficiencies.  
Table 6: Standardized scores for each Regulatory Agency 
 
those that only meet the minimum conditions (T2) b
 
1 T. AND TOBAGO 10.00 T. AND TOBAGO 10.00 NICARAGUA 10.00 T. AND TOBAGO 10
2 GUATEMALA 9.77 MEXICO 9.52 PERU 9.81 BOLIVIA 9.51
3 BOLIVIA 9.67 EL SALVADOR 9.20 BOLIVIA 9.66 T1 9.28
4 T 19 . 2 4 T 18 . 5 7 BRAZIL 9.28 BRAZIL 8.82
5 BRAZIL 8.57 COLOMBIA 8.39 PANAMA 9.25 PERU 8.58
6 PERU 8.03 PERU 8.25 R. DOMINICANA 9.24 GUATEMALA 8.2
7 ARGENTINA 7.73 BRAZIL 7.92 EL SALVADOR 8.91 EL SALVADOR 7.84
8 URUGUAY 7.72 BOLIVIA 6.78 BARBADOS 8.67 ARGENTINA 6.83
9 R. DOMINICANA 7.08 BARBADOS 6.71 T1 8.34 R. DOMINICANA 6.74
10 EL SALVADOR 7.07 COSTA RICA 6.35 COSTA RICA 8.28 BARBADOS 6.27
11 JAMAICA 6.05 NICARAGUA 5.25 GUATEMALA 7.73 NICARAGUA 5.75
12 BARBADOS 5.81 ARGENTINA 4.40 JAMAICA 7.53 COSTA RICA 5.71
13 COSTA RICA 5.30 ECUADOR 4.20 T. AND TOBAGO 7.44 COLOMBIA 5.58
14 NICARAGUA 5.19 T2 4.11 ARGENTINA 6.60 JAMAICA 5.32
15 COLOMBIA 5.11 R. DOMINICANA 3.74 COLOMBIA 6.29 URUGUAY 5.29
16 MEXICO 3.48 PANAMA 3.00 HONDURAS 6.15 MEXICO 3.94
17 T2 1.78 JAMAICA 2.57 ECUADOR 5.99 PANAMA 2.43
18 PANAMA 1.76 GUATEMALA 2.26 T2 4.54 T2 1.69
19 CHILE 1.54 URUGUAY 1.89 MEXICO 3.41 HONDURAS 0.91
20 HONDURAS 1.49 CHILE 1.63 URUGUAY 1.94 ECUADOR 0.62
21 ECUADOR 0.00 HONDURAS 0.00 CHILE 0.00 CHILE 0
Factor 1 (standardized) Factor 2 (standardized) Factor 3 (standardized) Aggregated Index (standardized)
 
 
The aggregated index reflects countries’ levels of regulatory governance after the three factors were 
integrated in a sole index. Electricity agencies in Trinidad and Tobago and Bolivia appear to be the 
entities with desirable governance conditions. Brazil and Peru, although in the range of Tier 2 
countries, are also close to Tier 1. Countries’ positions in this index are explained by 1) higher 
levels of formal transparency and accountability, and, in a less extent, by 2) higher levels of 
informality in autonomy, transparency, and accountability, and tools, and by 3) levels of formal 
autonomy and tariff regulation. As in the ERGI, the majority of countries in the LAC region only 
meet the minimum governance conditions to implement an independent regulatory agency model 
while Honduras, Ecuador, and Chile show the largest deficiencies among agencies. Results are 
onsistent with the Formal Transparency and Accountability Indexes where Honduras, Ecuador, and 
ansparency and accountability. On the other hand, Panama, Chile, 
cuador, and Honduras are below Tier 2 countries, with important deficits in transparency and 
ional development. Nevertheless, 
oth formal transparency and accountability only reflect governance aspects related to the design of 
c
Chile have the lowest scores. 
 
Results in Factor 1 do not change considerably compared to the aggregate index. Trinidad and 
Tobago, Bolivia, and Guatemala have agencies with desirable governance conditions in terms of 




The consideration of transparency and accountability as the main components that explain 
governance variations in the LAC region could be considered as a pattern related to agencies’ 
institutional quality. In other words, the main objective of tools and procedures is to increase the 
agency’s administrative capacities towards a more transparent management. This is particularly 
important if we think that most of the agencies in the region were installed as independent agencies 
whose main goal was to isolate regulatory decisions from political intervention but were not given 
adequate tools to involve users effectively or to improve its institut
b
the agencies or their procedures yet say little about their practices. 
 
  - 37 -This is particularly reflected in Factor 2, where informal autonomy, transparency, accountability 
and tools account for 15 percent of the variance. In this index Trinidad and Tobago remains the 
leading country. Nevertheless, Tier 1 countries change considerably and countries below Tier 2 
ecome the largest among all three factors. El Salvador and Mexico, together with Trinidad and 
xico is among Tier1 countries. 
evertheless, it holds a relatively low position in factors 1 and 2, both the manifestations of formal 
of countries 
uch as Guatemala that are among Tier 1 in terms of formal attributes, particularly transparency and 
 agency’s practices. Factor 3 shows the largest 
umber of agencies among Tier 1 countries (Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Panama, the 
f relevant issues. A 
imilar explanation applies to Chile. This said, factor 3 only explains formal attributes and is not a 
reflection of the agency’s practices which is particularly addressed by Factor 2. 
t variance. 
esults were similar in both approaches. Countries at the top and the bottom of the ERGI kept their 
positions in the API, with small variations among countries in the middle of the ranking. 
b
Tobago, present the best scores.  
 
The case of Mexico is particularly striking if we compare its low position with the rest of the factors 
and in the aggregate index. When it comes to several aspects of informality (autonomy, 
transparency, accountability) and the agency’s tools/capacities, Me
N
governance and of the competence of the agency to regulate tariffs. 
 
The second observation from Factor 2 is the significant number of countries that are below Tier 2 
agencies. Seven countries, almost double in the other factors and in the aggregate index, do not 
meet the minimum criteria in terms of some of the practices related to autonomy, transparency, 
accountability, and tools. Although factor 2 only explains 15 percent of the governance variations in 
the region, it is also an interesting observation to highlight the paradoxical situations 
s
accountability, but which have a low performance in terms of its governance practices.  
 
Factor 3 reflects governance aspects related to the design of the agency’s procedures to guarantee its 
autonomy and the agency’s power to regulate tariffs. Both aspects are related to the Formal 
Autonomy Index and have no correlation with the
n
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Barbados). 
 
A possible interpretation to results in Factor 3 could be the emphasis given by regulatory 
frameworks of the region to the autonomy of the agency from political authorities, particularly in 
terms of the determination of tariffs. This assumption can be confirmed by the positions of countries 
such as Mexico and Uruguay. Both in Mexico and Uruguay, the government has significant powers 
in the regulation of the sector, particularly in the determination of prices. Although separate from 
the government, regulatory agencies in these two countries are typically under the administrative 





The governance assessment of LAC electricity regulatory agencies analyzed regional trends in 
terms of four dimensions of their institutional design: autonomy, transparency, accountability, and 
tools. In doing so we used one main methodology and tested its robustness with positive results. 
The main methodology involved the consideration of autonomy, transparency, accountability, and 
tools as variables with equal weights, giving each of them and their indicators a value between 0 
and 1. We created a main aggregated index (ERGI) and different indexes according to the different 
aspects of governance. In order to test the robustness of that approach, we used Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and assigned variables different weights. We created a main index, 
Aggregate Principal Index (API), composed of the governance variables with the highes
R
  - 38 - 
In an attempt to distinguish LAC countries in different levels, we created three tiers of agencies. 
The first tier, countries above T1, represents agencies with desirable levels of governance. The 
second tier, countries between T1 and T2, represents countries with minimum governance levels. 
The third tier, countries below T2, represents countries that do not meet the minimum governance 
attributes as indicated in our framework. Our benchmark to assess the regulatory governance of 
lectricity agencies was the independent regulator model. 
 
ajority of the indexes, particularly when it comes to autonomy, transparency, and accountability.  
egulatory Autonomy Index, where the majority of countries are among T1 agencies. 
observe four main patterns in the governance of electricity regulatory 
gencies in the LAC region: 
al Autonomy and Tariff 
egulation, shows the largest number of agencies among Tier1 countries. 
bility to the 
xecutive, shows a large number of agencies (almost half of the agencies) below T2.  
e
 
In both general indexes (ERGI, API), Trinidad and Tobago’s Regulated Industry Commission is the 
agency with the highest standards of regulatory governance. Despite the regulated utility is a State-
Owned-Enterprise (SOE), the agency shows important levels of transparency and accountability, 
both in its design (formal governance) and in its practices (informal governance). This is observed 
not only in the different indexes that compose the ERGI but also in the different principal factors 
that were identified in the PCA. Brazil’s ANEEL, Bolivia’s SUPERELE, and Peru’s OSINERG are 
agencies that in some of our indexes are among Tier1 countries. Ecuador’s CONELEC, both Chile’s 
SEC and CNE, and Honduras’ CNE are agencies that score low in our regulatory governance 
framework. In the particular case of Chile, this is mostly due to the fact that this country has not 
implemented the model of independent agency and, hence, it shows a low performance in the
m
 
The rest of the countries vary with different degrees among Tier 2 agencies. Although Tier 1 
countries usually head the first places in the rankings, some Tier 2 countries also reach top positions 
in particular aspects. This is particularly the case in the Managerial Autonomy Index and the 
R
 
Our approach allowed us to 
a
 
Regulatory agencies in the LAC region were originally created to isolate regulatory decisions 
from political intervention and this has been reflected in their governance design. Regardless 
of the translation of their governance design into practice, there is a significant number of agencies 
with relevant regulatory powers (Regulatory Tools Index of the ERGI and Factor 3 of the API) and 
mechanisms to guarantee its flexible management (Managerial Autonomy Index). Around 75 
percent of the agencies in the region have final decision responsibilities in the determination of 
tariff structure and levels. Moreover, almost all the agencies have significant attributes regarding 
their employees. Likewise, Factor 3 of the PCA, which reflects Form
R
 
Nevertheless, the region has experienced difficulties in the implementation of the safeguards 
to guarantee the autonomous management of agencies. Factor 2 of the PAI and the Political 
Autonomy Index show the largest number of agencies among Tier 3 countries. In the former, which 
accounts for 14 percent of the variance in governance variables and reflects informal autonomy, 
transparency, accountability, and tools, almost 40 percent of the countries do not meet minimum 
governance conditions. In the latter, almost 70 percent of the countries do not meet the minim 
governance requirements to guarantee the insulation of the agency from politics. Moreover, the 
Informal Accountability Index, which assesses the degree of agency’s accounta
E
 
Regulatory agencies of the region do not show a positive performance on institutional, non-
regulatory, mechanisms aimed at improving its transparency and overall institutional quality. 
  - 39 -Different from other countries where the regulatory agency model had a better fit, particularly 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia, in the LAC region the role of 
independent agencies beyond regulatory responsibilities was poorly defined and understood. For 
instance, the use of regulatory quality standards such as administrative simplification or the use of 
cost-benefit analysis in the assessment of regulations has not, with exceptions, been reflected in 
their governance. Moreover, 30 percent of agencies do not publish their job vacancies and almost 50 
ercent do not use public examinations to hire employees. 
one that better explains regulatory governance among electricity agencies of the LAC 
gion. 
ievements that many LAC countries have reached in 




These aspects have been reflected in the Institutional Transparency Index where around 40 percent 
of the agencies are below T2 countries. This index assesses the institutional side of transparency 
and includes indicators related to the ways the agency reports its performance, the publication of 
their financial accounts, the use of norms of ethics, and the publication of their vacancies. Factor 2 
of the PCA, which includes informal autonomy, transparency, and accountability, also shows a 
large percentage (40 percent) of agencies below T2 levels. Moreover, Factor 1 of the PCA indicates 




The implementation of the independent agency model is context dependent.  The independent 
regulator model is an Anglo-Saxon institution which is, in principle, strange to most LAC legal and 
institutional regimes. The latter, which adopted the rigid and formalistic French administrative 
system, had to redefine the delegation of administrative powers to more independent and powerful 
regulatory agencies. This might be reflected in the fact that Anglo-Saxon countries of the Caribbean 
(Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Jamaica) have, in average, better scores than the non Anglo-
Saxon countries of the region. In some Latin American countries, independent agencies became an 
appendix to the line Minister, being only responsible for technical aspects of regulation. Yet, this 




  - 40 -Appendix 1: Characteristics of LAC electricity agencies that submitted the survey. 
Staff 
number  Name Year  Legal  status  Budget 
sources 
Appeals’ 
authority  Accountability 
Separate entity with 









Ente Nacional Regulador de la 
Electricidad (Argentina)  1993  Regulation tax 
Separate entity with 





  Executive and 
Congress  2001  Judicial review  29  Fair Trading Commission 
(Barbados) 
Separate entity with 






1996  Regulation tax  Judicial review  68 
Separate entity with 




Agencia Nacional de Energía 
Eléctrica (Brazil) 
1997  Regulation tax  Judicial review  765 
A separate entity 
with no autonomy 
from the line ministry 
Executive and 
Congress 
From 51 to 
100 
Comisión de Regulación de 
Energía y Gas (Colombia)  1994  Regulation tax  Judicial review 
A separate entity 
with autonomy from 





Superintendencia de Servicios 
Públicos (Colombia)  1994  Judicial review  305 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Unidad Reguladora de 
Servicios Públicos (Costa Rica) 
1996  Regulation tax  Judicial review  Congress  167 
Separate entity with 
no autonomy from 






Comisión Nacional de Energía 
(Chile)  1978  Government 44 
Separate entity with 











100  1985  Government 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Consejo Nacional de 
Electricidad (Ecuador) 
1999  Regulation tax  Judicial review Government  100 
Separate entity with 










100  1998  Regulation tax 




Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Government and 
Congress  1997  Regulation tax  Judicial review  106 
Separate entity with 
no autonomy from 





From 51 to 
100 
Comisión Nacional de Energía 
Eléctrica (Guatemala) 
1996  Regulation tax 
Separate entity with 








Comisión Nacional de Energía 
(Honduras)  1995  Judicial review 
Separate entity with 




Office of Utilities Regulation 
(Jamaica)  1997  No answer  Judicial review  45 
Separate entity with 






Comisión Reguladora de 
Energía (México) 
1995  Judicial review  130 
Separate entity with 




Instituto Nicaragüense de 
Electricidad (Nicaragua)  1994  Regulation tax  Judicial review  200 
Separate entity with 




Autoridad Nacional de los 
Servicios Públicos (Panamá)  1996  Regulation tax  Judicial review  Government 
Separate entity with 




Organismo Supervisor de la 
Inversión en Energía (Perú) 
1996  Regulation tax  Judicial review  187 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Regulated Industries 





20  2000  Regulation tax  Judicial review 
Separate entity with 
no autonomy from 
the line ministry 
Unidad Reguladora de 





Congress  2000  Regulation tax  18 
                                                 
TP
10
  - 41 -
 Executive review generally involves the line minister or the President as the authorities in charge of reviewing an 
agency’s decision. Judicial review implies the revision of the decision by a court. Appendix 2: Electricity Regulatory Governance Survey 
 
 































  - 49 -APPENDIX 2: ELECTRICITY REGULATORY GOVERNANCE INDEX (ERGI) 
AUTONOMY  TRANSPARENCY  ACCOUNTABILITY  TOOLS 









































































By whom are 
appeals 
considered Q55_V 
Regulation of the 
sector Q25_V 



































Evolution of the 
budget Q48_V 
Annual report 




















Norms of ethics 


















Public exam. for 
employees 
Q82_V 
Req. to be 






Use of norms 
of ethics 
Q97_V 







policies Q43_V         Structure of posts 

















         
Budget’s sources 
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Renew. Direct. 
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